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FINANCING PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUITS: AN INCREASINGLY
POPULAR (AND LEGAL) BUSINESS
Susan Lorde Martin*
In the late eighties and early nineties there were a few publicized cases in
which the plaintiffs invited investors to finance their litigation in ex-
change for a share of the awards if the plaintiffs won. This kind of
arrangement provides access to the justice system which might otherwise be
denied impecunious plaintiffs with meritorious claims. The problem with
this kind of arrangement is that it is champerty, which is prohibited in
most states. This Article discusses Massachusetts' recent rejection of the
champerty prohibition, the expansion of exceptions to the prohibition in
this country and others, and the emergence of firms whose business is in-
vesting in litigation. The Article concludes that any potential evils
associated with champerty are addressed in a variety of other laws and,
therefore, champertous agreements should be enforceable.
INTRODUCTION
In the late eighties and early nineties, articles about investing in
other people's lawsuits started appearing in journals, magazines,
and newspapers with some regularity.1 The sudden interest was
sparked by a few cases in which the plaintiffs invited investors to
finance their litigation in exchange for a share of the awards if the
plaintiffs won. The case that particularly attracted the public's at-
tention was Intex Plastic Sales Co. v. HalL3 It was attention-getting
not only because it involved an unusual method of financing the
litigation, but also because it involved waterbeds. When the
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Frank G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra
University, Hempstead, New York. J.D. 1987, Hofstra University School of Law; A.B. 1963,
Barnard College. Editor-in-Chief, AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL. Of counsel, Martin,
Fallon & MullS, Huntington, N.Y.
1. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business
Opportunity?, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (1992); Donald L. Abraham, Note, Investor-Financed Law-
suits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43
SYRACUSE L. Riv. 1297 (1992); Financing Inventors'Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989, at 36;
Linda Himelstein, Legal Affairs: Investors Wanted-for Lawsuits, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 78;
Richard B. Schmitt, Selling Interests in Syndicated Lawsuits Raises Cash--and Questions over Eth-
ics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1998, at B1; Catherine Yang, Psst! Wanna Buy a Lawsuit?, FORBES,
May 19, 1986, at 67.
2. See Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878 (Ct. App. 1991); Intex Plastics Sales
Co. v. Hall, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
3. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
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inventor of the waterbed did not have the funds to pursue a patent
infringement claim against a $20 million company selling water-
beds, he exchanged a share of any proceeds recovered from the
alleged infringer for an investment group's financial and adminis-
trative support for litigation of the claim.4 The defendant waterbed
company had the suit dismissed on the grounds of champerty.5
Champerty is a practice in which one person, the champertor,
agrees to support another in bringing a legal action, in exchange
for part of the proceeds of the litigation.6 It is a form of mainte-
nance, which is a general category that includes any agreement by
which one person finances another's legal action.7 These arrange-
ments have been prohibited either by common law, statutory law,
or public policy throughout the United States and the United
Kingdom.8 The champerty doctrine, which prohibits the purchase
of litigation rights, is based on longstanding fears that champertors
will encourage frivolous litigation, harass defendants, increase
damages, and resist settlement. 9
In spite of the fears, however, exceptions to the prohibition on
champerty have been commonplace because of a recognition that
without third party support some meritorious plaintiffs who lacked
the financial wherewithal would not be able to litigate their
claims.'0 As far back as 1787, for example, Jeremy Bentham railed
against "the antique laws" prohibiting "the hard-named and little-
heard-of practice of Champerty."" He asserted that
4. See Edward S. Wright, Investment in Litigation from the Plaintiffs Perspective 2
(on file with author). Wright was the attorney for the inventor.
5. See Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. Hall, No. C-85-2987-JPV (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1989).
Subsequently, Hall, the inventor, assigned an interest in his patent and the court granted his
motions to reinstate his claim and to join the assignee in the action. See Intex Plastics Sales
Co. v. Hall, No. C-85-2987-JPV (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1990). After a jury trial and a hearing on
post-judgment motions, the district court affirmed the jury's finding that Hall held a valid
patent that was infringed and awarded Hall damages and interest of almost $6,500,000. See
id.
6. See generally Martin, supra note 1; Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L.
REv. 48, 48-78 (1935); Y.L. Tan, Champertous Contracts and Assignments, 106 L.Q. REv. 656,
656-79 (1990).
7. See Tan, supra note 6, at 657. Barratry is another form of maintenance that specifi-
cally refers to promoting and exciting groundless lawsuits. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 158
(West 1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-1001 (1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-11 (West 1998)
(defining common barratry in each jurisdiction).
8. See generally infra notes 14, 31, 73-79, 83-86, 93-94, 101 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, The Effect of Champerty on Contractual Liability, 79 L.Q REv. 493, 494
(1963).
10. See generally infra notes 127, 137-38, 155-60 and accompanying text.
11. JEREMY BENTHAM, Letters I & XII, in IN DEFENCE OF USURY 1-5, 117-28 (1787).
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[w]ealth has indeed the monopoly of justice against poverty:
and such monopoly it is the direct tendency and necessary ef-
fect of regulations like [those prohibiting champerty] to
strengthen and confirm. But with this monopoly no judge
that lives now is at all chargeable. The law created this mo-
nopoly: the law, whenever it pleases, may dissolve it.2
More than two hundred years later, as this century comes to a
close, the law is starting to dissolve some of the prohibitions against
third party support for meritorious litigation.
One important development is the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court's rejection of champerty as a cause of action,
overturning hundreds of years of legal precedent." Part I of this
Article discusses that court's groundbreaking decision and com-
pares it with existing law in other states. Part II addresses the
expansion of the exceptions to the champerty prohibition, includ-
ing the issue of lawyers' contingency fees, in this country and
others. Part III describes the emergence of firms whose business is
champerty, that is, investing in litigation. Before concluding that
the champerty prohibition should be abolished and investment in
litigation accepted, the Article reviews the various mechanisms
available to specifically address the evils champerty was assumed to
create.
I. CHAMPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Massachusetts
Massachusetts had enforced through common law a prohibition
against maintenance and champerty, 14 but with significant excep-
tions. For example, Massachusetts courts have not prohibited
agreements where the alleged champertor had some intent and
interest other than bringing suit. 15 As long ago as 1894, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that agreements to
support a lawsuit in exchange for a share of its proceeds may actu-
ally have the beneficial effect of encouraging dispute resolution.1
6
Finally, after a series of cases in which the court questioned the
12. Id. at 123.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 14-19.
14. See, e.g., Thurston v. Percival, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 415, 416-17 (1823).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Fowle, 132 Mass. 385, 388-89 (1882).
16. See Joy v. Metcalf, 37 N.E. 671 (Mass. 1894).
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usefulness of maintenance and champerty doctrines," at the end of
1997 the court held in Saladini v. Righellis8 that "the common law
doctrines of champerty, barratry, and maintenance no longer shall
be recognized in Massachusetts."19 In that case, Saladini agreed in
writing to provide the funds for Righellis to pursue a legal claim
arising out of his interest in Putnam Manor, real property in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. ° In exchange, any recovery would first be
used to reimburse Saladini and then, after the attorney was paid,
she would receive fifty percent of any remaining funds." Righellis
was not satisfied with his attorney, hired a new one, and orally
agreed with Saladini, who paid half the new lawyer's retainer and
disbursements, that their original agreement would remain in ef-
fect.22 Saladini paid Righellis a total of $19,229.23
Righellis settled the Putnam Manor lawsuit for $130,000 and re-
ceived some of that money but did not tell Saladini.24 When
Saladini found out, she filed suit, but her complaint was dismissed
because the judge ruled her agreement with Righellis was
"champertous and unenforceable as against public policy."25 She
appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court found in her favor.26
The court noted that the champerty doctrine is no longer neces-
sary because there are other ways to limit frivolous lawsuits and
other such mischief27 The court provided some guidance on how it
would proceed without the champerty doctrine. When faced with a
litigation-financing agreement, the court will look to see that the
fees are reasonable and that there has not been "impermissible
overreaching by the financier."28 In the instant case the court con-
cluded that it would be unfair for Righellis to receive a windfall at
Saladini's expense.29
While eliminating the champerty doctrine in Massachusetts, the
court specifically stated in a footnote that it was not authorizing
17. See, e.g., Berman v. Linnane, 679 N.E.2d 174 (Mass. 1997); Christian v. Mooney,
511 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Christian v. Bewkes, 484 U.S. 1053 (1988);
McInerney v. Massasoit Greyhound Ass'n, 269 N.E.2d 211 (Mass. 1971).
18. 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
19. Id. at 1224; see also sources cited supra note 7 (explaining barratry).
20. 687 N.E.2d at 1224-25.





26. See id. at 1226.
27. See id. at 1226-27.
28. Id. at 1227.
29. See id. at 1228.
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"the syndication of lawsuits."3° The court gave no explanation of
this dicta. It seems to mean that it is permissible for one person,
like Saladini, or one business entity to support someone else's law-
suit, but it may not be permissible for a group, i.e., a syndicate, to
do the same thing. If, however, there is no champerty prohibition
in Massachusetts, it is not clear on what grounds a syndicate's sup-
port of another's lawsuit that is not frivolous or harassing or
mischievous would void the lawsuit. Perhaps the court, not faced in
this case with the syndication issue, wanted to make it clear that it
was not encouraging a new industry in litigation without having
had the need to investigate any unforeseen implications of such a
development. In spite of these reservations, Massachusetts has now
gone far beyond most other states in permitting litigants to seek
outside support for their legal expenses.
B. New York
In New York, by statute, no corporation or association, nor any
person or partnership in the collection or adjustment of claims
business, may acquire an interest in any thing in action or any
claim "with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or
proceeding thereon."3 Violation is a misdemeanor resulting in a
30. Id. at 1227 n.7.
31. The statute reads:
§ 489. Purchase of claims by corporations or collection agencies.
No person or co-partnership, engaged directly or indirectly in the business of collec-
tion and adjustment of claims, and no corporation or association, directly or
indirectly, itself or by or through its officers, agents or employees, shall solicit, buy or
take an assignment of, or be in any manner interested in buying or taking an assign-
ment of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in
action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an
action or proceeding thereon; provided however, that bills receivable, notes receiv-
able, bills of exchange, judgments or other things in action may be solicited, bought,
or assignment thereof taken, from any executor, administrator, assignee for the
benefit of creditors, trustee or receiver in bankruptcy, or any other person or persons
in charge of the administration, settlement or compromise of any estate, through
court actions, proceedings or otherwise. Nothing herein contained shall affect any as-
signment heretofore or hereafter taken by any moneyed corporation authorized to
do business in the state of New York or its nominee pursuant to a subrogation agree-
ment or a salvage operation, or by any corporation organized for religious,
benevolent or charitable purposes.
N.Y.JuD. LAw § 489 (McKinney 1999).
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penalty of not more than $5000,32 but a violation can also result in
the dismissal of an otherwise legitimate legal claim. 3
The last time the New York Court of Appeals ruled on this issue,
in 1971, it described the legislative reasons for making champerty
and maintenance illegal as being to "prevent the resulting strife,
discord and harassment which could result from permitting attor-
neys and corporations to purchase claims for the purpose of
bringing actions thereon."3 The court, in holding that the cham-
perty and maintenance statute, Judiciary Law Section 489, had not
been violated, noted that "in order to fall within the statutory pro-
hibition, the assignment [of a legal claim] must be made for the
very purpose of bringing suit and this implies an exclusion of any
other purpose."35 Thus, the court construed the statute narrowly
(just as the Massachusetts court had interpreted its common law
prohibition before eliminating it entirely), as generally required
for a penal statute. Nevertheless, the court accepted the age-old
wisdom that champerty would bring strife without explaining how
that would happen.
In more recent cases, lower New York courts have frequently
found that the prohibition in Judiciary Law Section 489 did not
apply to the alleged champertor because, in fact, no mischief or
strife had been caused. For example, New York courts have rou-
tinely held that when an assignee of a note and mortgage brings a
foreclosure action against the defaulting borrower, the assignee is
not in violation of Section 489 when foreclosure has "a legitimate
business purpose."3 In one such case, Limpar Realty Corp. v. Uswiss
Realty Holding, Inc.,37 Uswiss gave General Electric Credit Corpora-
tion (GECC) a mortgage to secure a $1,750,000 note payable to
GECC.38 Uswiss missed its monthly payments, defaulting on the
note. 9 GECC accelerated the loan balance and then assigned the
note and mortgage to Limpar for $1,801,397. 40 Less than a month
after acquiring the mortgage, Limpar commenced this foreclosure
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Bluebird Partners v. First Fidelity Bank, 686 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (App. Div. 1999).
34. Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691, 693 (N.Y.
1971).
35. Id.
36. Limpar Realty Corp. v. Uswiss Realty Holding, Inc., 492 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (App.
Div. 1985); see also G.G.F. Dev. Corp. v. Andreadis, 676 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1998); Small
Bus. Admin. v. Mills, 610 N.Y.S.2d 371 (App. Div. 1994); Wainco Funding v. Logiudice, 606
N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div. 1993).
37. 492 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 754-55.
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action against Uswiss. 41 Uswiss contended that Limpar had violated
Section 489, but the First Department of the Appellate Division
dismissed the contention because Limpar's "intent to sue was
merely incidental and contingent" to their "legitimate business
purpose" of assembling properties on one block.42
The reasoning in the mortgage cases is not very persuasive. The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York has correctly concluded that New York case law is clear: even
if a mortgage is purchased for the sole purpose of foreclosing, Sec-
tion 489 is not violated.43 The assignees in these cases have violated
the letter of the statute, but they have not stirred up litigation.
They have merely substituted themselves for the original parties in
interest because they each perceive the exchange to serve their
business interests.
A comparison of two New York cases illustrates how courts apply
the letter of the statute if the alleged champertor is engaged in
some kind of undesirable behavior other than merely buying an
interest in another's litigation but will get around the statute if the
alleged champertor's behavior seems benign. In Ehrlich v. Rebco
Insurance Exchange, Ltd.,4 Ehrlich, the plaintiff and an attorney,
sued for breach of a contract in which he was retained by Rebco as
a legal consultant for four and a half years at an annual fee of
$80,000. 4 Dr. Carl Neuman was president of Rebco and its only
insured.4 Rebco assigned Ehrlich to represent Neuman in ap-
proximately one hundred medical malpractice actions.47 When
Rebco did not pay money owed over a two-year period, Ehrlich
terminated the agreement and brought suit.48 Before the litigation,
Ehrlich had referred Neuman to another law firm for bringing a
tax certiorari proceeding concerning a piece of property owned by
the Sarah H. Neuman Foundation and leased to Neuman, who was
president of the Foundation. 49 Ehrlich received a referral fee from
that law firm.5° When Ehrlich instituted the instant case, Neuman
counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment
41. See id.
42. Id. at 756.
43. See Downtown Athletic Club v. Caspi Dev. Corp., No. 98 B41419 JLG, 1998 WL
898226, at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1998).
44. 649 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1996).
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based on Ehrlich's acceptance of the referral fee .5 The counter-
claim was based on a written agreement in which the Foundation
assigned its claim against Ehrlich to Rebco, and Rebco agreed to
pursue legal remedies against Ehrlich to recover the amount of the
referral fee. Ehrlich moved to have the counterclaims dismissed
because they violated Section 489.5s
Rebco cited Sygna Photo News, Inc. v. Globe International, Inc.54 in
arguing that its actions did not violate Section 489 because Ehrlich
had already instituted his lawsuit when Rebco entered into the
agreement with the Foundation, and, therefore, the Foundation's
assignment could not have been for the purpose of bringing an
action. In Sygma a photographer who had taken pictures of the
British royal family assigned the copyrights in the photographs to
his agent for the sole purpose of prosecuting infringement claims
against a publisher who published photographs before an agreed
upon date. 6 The agent agreed to assign the copyrights back to the
photographer after the litigation was concluded and to donate the
proceeds of the action to charity.57 Evidence indicated this ar-
rangement was made because the photographer did not live in the
United States and was not going to be available to appear in
court.5s The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the infringement action was not barred by
Section 489 because the assigned claims were asserted in an action
that had already "'been commenced and the mischief the statute
[sought] to avoid [was] non-existent.' ,
59
The New York Appellate Division First Department, deciding
Ehrlich in favor of the plaintiff and holding that Rebco violated Sec-
tion 489, rejected the Sygma decision because "while the
assignment occurred after the plaintiff had filed suit asserting
other claims, the assertion of additional claims based on the as-
signment was indeed the very 'mischief the statute seeks to
avoid.' 60 The facts of each of these cases suggest that the outcomes
had more to do with "mischief" of some kind than to the statute's
language. The photographer's agent in Sygma, although accepting
the assignment for the purpose of pursuing litigation in violation
51. See id.
52. See id. at 673-74.
53. See id. at 674.
54. 616 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
55. See Ehrlich, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
56. 616 F. Supp. at 1155.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1157 n.5.
59. Id. at 1157 (citations omitted).
60. Ehrlich, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (citations omitted).
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of the words of the statute, was not bringing a frivolous suit, was
not stirring up litigation, but was merely helping the photographer
pursue his legitimate interests. Neuman, on the other hand, was a
man frequently in legal difficulties who attempted to exploit the
system to extricate himself from those difficulties. It was, therefore,
convenient to be able to bar Neuman's counterclaim because it
violated Section 489, but that violation was not the crux of Neu-
man's "mischief." That violation served as no more than an excuse
to inconvenience him for other wrongs he had probably commit-
ted. If a primary purpose of Section 489 is to avoid the strife of
bringing legal actions, then perhaps Neuman should have been
allowed to continue with his counterclaim, and the photographer's
agent should have been prohibited from continuing his suit. If that
had happened, the latter suit might have been discontinued be-
cause the photographer could not have pursued it himself,
whereas Neuman could reinstitute his claims by starting a lawsuit
against Ehrlich in the name of the Foundation, the actual party
allegedly wronged. Such outcomes would, of course, be very unsat-
isfying and would seem not to serve the cause ofjustice.
Judges in New York have long recognized that Section 489 is
unnecessary to control groundless suits and that third party sup-
port does not necessarily encourage groundless suits.6' The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently
suggested that the policy underlying Section 489 is "a relic of Me-
dieval English legal concerns" and fits "uncomfortably with current
sensibilities."62 Nevertheless, until the New York legislature decides
to act, the state is stuck with this anachronism.
C. Alabama and Ohio
In Alabama an appellate court gave credence to the common
law champerty doctrine on grounds different from those generally
referred to in Massachusetts or New York opinions.63 In Wilson v.
Harris Wilson agreed to give Harris, a friend of many years who
61. See, e.g., Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 643 (N.Y. 1824) ("[Wlhere the
laws give adequate redress for groundless suits, it is not easy to conceive, that mischief can
arise... from contracts by which the fruits of a suit may be divided between him who has
the right of action, and him who has contributed ... expense.., to institute the suit.").
62. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1998),
rev'd sub nom. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de ]a Naci6n, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).




University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
was in financial difficulty, $400 a month in exchange for Harris'
assigning to him part of any recovery she might realize from a
wrongful death case she had pending on appeal.65 When her ap-
peal was concluded, she refused to give Wilson the agreed-upon
share of the proceeds.' Wilson alleged breach of contract.67 He de-
scribed entering into similar agreements with other people who
were short of cash but had lawsuits pending.6 In each instance the
borrower would have no means to repay Wilson but for a successful
outcome of the pending suit.
The court determined that Harris' agreement with Wilson was
not exactly champertous because Harris already had a judgment
on appeal when she entered into the agreement with Wilson. 69
Nevertheless, the court refused to enforce the agreement because,
even though it did not satisfy all the requirements for champerty, it
was "closely akin to champerty" and "violate[d] the public policy
against gambling and speculating in litigation." 70 The opinion sug-
gests the court's belief that the primary purpose of the champerty
doctrine is to eliminate "gambling in litigation."7 Thus, it seems
quite clear that in Alabama investing in litigation would be consid-
ered a particularly undesirable form of gambling which the law
would not sanction.
The situation in Ohio may be similar to the one in Alabama.
While Ohio courts do not recognize a common law cause of action
for maintenance or champerty, an appellate court noted that the
doctrines can be used as a contract defense.72 Although the re-
ported cases it cites for that proposition were decided in 1823,73
1885, TM 1892,75 1953,76 and 1954,77 in the 1954 decision the court
found an attorney guilty of maintenance.78 It explained its decision
as an effort not to encourage "a gambling spirit."79 One might
speculate whether investors in internet stocks are any less gamblers
than investors in litigation.
65. See id. at 266.
66. See id. at 268.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 269.
70. See id. at 270.
71. Id. (citing Lott v. Kees, 165 So. 2d 106, 110 (Ala. 1964)).
72. See Tosi v.Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
73. See Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 (1823).
74. See Stewart v. Welch, 41 Ohio 483 (1885).
75. See Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747 (Ohio 1892).
76. See Rice v. Pigman, 114 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio 1953).
77. See Lo Guidice v. Harris, 128 N.E.2d 842 (Ohio 1954).




D. Alaska, Colorado, Kentucky, Georgia, Maryland,
Nevada, Oklahoma, and Montana
This group of states prohibits champerty to some extent, but has
not, in fact, invalidated an agreement on that basis in recent years,
if at all. Whether that pattern would continue if the issue were the
champertous nature of an agreement between a group of investors
and a litigant whose lawsuit they were financing is highly specula-
tive.
The Alaska Supreme Court, while still suggesting that its com-
mon law prohibition against champerty is in effect, has not
enforced it in any recent case. 0 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Colorado has mentioned common law champerty and mainte-
nance"' but has not in recent years invalidated an agreement on
those grounds. Kentucky has a statute that declares void as cham-
pertous a contract for the purpose of aiding in the prosecution or
defense of a lawsuit in exchange for any part of the requested re-
covery. 2 Nevertheless, Kentucky too has not voided a contract on
that ground in recent years. In dicta in 199283 and 19974 the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky suggested that champerty could be used
as a defense, but the cases it cited for that proposition were de-
cided in 189585 and 1909.86
Georgia has a statute providing that contracts contrary to public
policy cannot be enforced, including, "contracts of maintenance or
champerty. 8 7 The Georgia Supreme Court has noted, however,
that "the delicate and undefined power of courts to declare a con-
tract void as contravening public policy should be exercised with
great caution, and only in cases free from substantial doubt."8 Ap-
parently taking this statement very seriously, Georgia courts have
not invalidated any contracts as violative of the statutory prohibi-
tion against champerty.
80. See, e.g., Wichman v. Benner, 948 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1997) (holding that hospital's
assignment of its claims in malpractice action did not violate public policy against champerty
and maintenance); Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993) (holding that hospital's
assignment of its claims in malpractice action did not violate public policy against champerty
and maintenance).
81. See People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1997).
82. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.060 (Michie 1998).
83. See McCullar v. Credit Bureau Sys., 832 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1992).
84. See Great W. Land Mgmt. v. Slusher, 939 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1997).
85. SeeWemhoffv. Rutherford, 98 Ky. 91 (1895).
86. See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maxberry, 121 S.W. 447 (Ky. 1909).
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(a) (5) (1998).
88, Foster v. Allen, 40 S.E.2d 57, 59 (Ga. 1946).
FALL 1999-WINTER 2000]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Maryland has a criminal statute, with a penalty of incarceration
for one year and a fine of $1000, that prohibits a person from solic-
iting, for personal gain, another person to sue or retain a lawyer to
represent the other person in a lawsuit.89 There has not, however,
been any reported case in which a violation of the statute was up-
held. In the one case where it was alleged, an appellate court held
that the plaintiff was the one who had sought the help of the de-
fendant, a person who for a fee assisted Korean people in finding a
lawyer, and therefore there was no proscribed meddling.9°
In the only recently decided case dealing with champerty in Ne-
vada, the court held that an investment relationship was not
champertous.9' The Nevada Supreme Court held that as long as
investors in litigation have some interest in the litigation, or merely
reasonably believe they have some interest, their agreement to fi-
nance the litigation is not champertous. 92 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court within the last few years has noted that the reasons for a public
policy prohibiting champerty have disappeared.93 Notwithstanding
that assertion, the court referred to still-existing champerty statutes
in Oklahoma.94 Although the statutes refer only to agreements in-
volving real property,95 their mere existence and the court's refusal
to hold specifically that champerty is not recognized in Oklahoma
allows for a possible revitalization of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Montana has asserted, inexplicably, that
the purpose of the common law champerty prohibition was to pre-
vent attorneys from stirring up litigation,96 although clearly
champerty applied to everyone including, but not limited to, at-
torneys. That interpretation has been codified in Montana to
prohibit attorneys from having an interest in any thing in action
for the purpose of instituting litigation.97 By the letter of the stat-
ute, non-attorneys could invest in another's litigation with the
hope of making a profit.98
89. See MD. CODE ANN. Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-604(a) (1998).
90. SeeSon v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider &Tomar, 709A.2d 112, 121 (Md. 1998).
91. See Schwartz v. Eliades, 939 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Nev. 1997).
92. See id.
93. See Voiles v. Sante Fe Minerals, Inc., 911 P.2d 1205, 1212 (Okla. 1996).
94. See id.
95. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 547, 548 (1991).
96. See Green v. Gremaux, 945 P.2d 903 (Mont. 1997).
97. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-408 (1999).
98. The statute reads:




E. Florida and South Carolina
An appellate court in Florida has not eliminated the mainte-
nance and champerty doctrines from Florida common law but has
redefined them according to the "modern view," noting that no
state adheres to the original strict formulations." In that view,
"officious intermeddling is a necessary element" of the doctrines.00
Thus, giving unnecessary and unwanted services and being med-
dlesome in an overbearing way is not permitted.'O° In Kraft v.
Mason,02 the facts were very similar to those in the Massachusetts
case, Saladini v. Righellis.'°3 Kraft was a plaintiff in a federal antitrust
suit.10 4 He did not have the financial resources to continue pursu-
ing the case, so he borrowed $100,000 from his sister, guaranteeing
repayment of the loan and interest plus a percentage of any recov-105
ery. The suit settled for over $5 million, but Kraft refused to pay
his sister the agreed-upon amount.106 She sued him, and he used
the champertous nature of their agreement as a defense.10 7 The
court rejected the champerty argument, noting that the sister did
not act in an officious manner, intermeddle, instigate the litiga-
tion, bargain for the terms of the loan (they were prepared by
Kraft), or impose her views on the litigants or their attorneys.108
Thus, the Florida court came to the same conclusion as the Massa-
chusetts court, but without invalidating the entire champerty
(1) An attorney and counselor must not directly or indirectly buy or be in any
manner interested in buying a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange,
book debt, or other thing in action with the intent and for the purpose of
bringing an action thereon.
(2) An attorney and counselor must not, by himself or by or in the name of
another person, either before or after action brought, promise or give or
procure to be promised or given a valuable consideration to any person as
an inducement to placing or in consideration of having placed in his hands
or in the hands of another person a demand of any kind for the purpose of
bringing an action thereon. This subsection does not apply to an agree-
ment between attorneys and counselors, or either, to divide between
themselves the compensation to be received.
Id.
99. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
103. 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
104. See id. at 681.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 681-82.
107. See id. at 682.
108. See id at 683.
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doctrine. The Massachusetts holding is, however, a more straight-
forward way of achieving the result. The financial support of
another's litigation in exchange for part of the litigation's pro-
ceeds is not necessarily troublesome, so that behavior alone should
not trigger a legal inquiry. Massachusetts has adopted the truly
modem view by eliminating champerty as a cause of action alto-
gether. Nevertheless, it remains a question whether the courts in
either state would be as sanguine about upholding the rights of
professional investors as they were about upholding the rights of a
single litigation supporter who was a friend or family member of
the litigant.
A South Carolina appellate court last year took the same ap-
proach as the Florida appellate court but, while the Florida court
called its interpretation "modem," the South Carolina court re-
jected appeals to "modem jurisprudence" and emphasized its
reliance on old law.' 9 In Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Limited Partnership
°
the Cabana defendants had been plaintiffs in a federal lender li-
ability action."' Their lawyers in the federal action arranged for
Osprey to pay them $50,000 in exchange for an interest in the liti-
gation."2 Cabana settled the suit for $650,000 but refused to pay
Osprey the amount owed under the agreement."3 Osprey sued Ca-
bana for, inter alia, breach of contract." 4 Cabana succeeded before
the trial court in arguing that the suit should be dismissed because
the contract was champertous and therefore unenforceable." 5
The appellate court, although acknowledging that there were no
appellate decisions in South Carolina voiding an agreement as
champertous, confirmed that champerty is prohibited in the
state. 1 6 The court relied on a South Carolina Supreme Court opin-
ion from 1830 that mentioned champerty unfavorably, 7 and a
state statute that provides that the "common law of England ...
[shall] continue[] in full force and effect."' 8 The court noted that
109. See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. Parmership, 509 S.E.2d 275, 277-78 (S.C. Ct. App.





114. See id. at 277.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379, 401 (1830) (defining as a champertor a
person who sues on behalf of an impoverished individual with the stipulation that they di-
vide the recovery).
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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champerty is clearly part of the common law of England." 9 The
court also rejected Osprey's argument that modern jurisprudence
and commercial practices oppose the prohibition against chain-
perty. 120 The court did hold, however, that the prohibited behavior
occurs only when the champertor acts officiously and for the pur-
pose of "'stirring up strife and continuing litigation.' " 2 ' The court,
after reviewing the facts of the case, held that there were certainly
issues of fact regarding whether Osprey engaged in such officious
intermeddling with wrongful intentions and suggested that there
was evidence that Osprey had not.1
22
F. Other States
Other states similarly slip and slide around the champerty issue,
relying on statutes, common law, and public policy to prohibit it
but often not enforcing the prohibition to the letter of the law.
2 3
Until the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared chain-
perty no longer illegal in that state, NewJersey was the only state to
permit and enforce champertous agreements.'24 With only two
states refusing to invalidate contracts because they are champer-
tous, it might seem that the doctrine is generally maintaining its
viability. When developments in other countries are considered,
however, that viability becomes less assured.
119. See Osprey, 509 S.E.2d at 277.
120. See id. at 278.
121. Id. at 279.
122. See id.
123. See generally Martin, supra note 1; Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U.
PA. L. Rav. 1529, 1547-55 (1996).
124. See, e.g., Bron v. Weintraub, 199 A.2d 625, 629 n.1 (N.J. 1964); Schomp v. Schenck,
40 N.J.L. 195, 204 (1878) (noting that doctrines of maintenance and champerty were de-
termined to be "'inapplicable'" in NewJersey as early as 1792); Polo v. Gotchel, 542 A.2d 947,
949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); Hughes v. Eisner, 72 A.2d 901, 902 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1950); Weller v. Jersey City H & P St. Ry. Co., 57 A. 730, 732 (N.J. Ch. 1904) (stating
that the prohibition of maintenance and champerty never prevailed in New Jersey as indi-
cated in a "learned and exhaustive opinion" of Chief Justice Beasley in Schomp v. Schenck).
One commentator has advised investment litigation companies to negotiate and execute
their agreements in New Jersey where they will be enforceable. See Dobner, supra note 123,
at 1588-89.
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II. EXPANDING EXCEPTIONS TO THE CHAMPERTY PROHIBITION
In the United States, as well as in England, Australia, and Can-
ada, courts have increasingly relaxed the champerty prohibition. In
the United States, for example, the most notable exception is the
contingency fee system. A lawyer's agreement to handle a case in
exchange for a percentage of the damages recovered, if any, is
clearly champertous. Nevertheless, all states recognize such agree-
ments. 2 5 By the mid-nineteenth century most states had rejected
the English rule prohibiting contingency fee arrangements be-
tween lawyers and their clients.16 In the United States the open
court door policy has had a preeminent place, and the contingency
legal fee has been viewed as the poor and middle income person's
ticket to justice.12 7 Most other countries, on the other hand, outlaw
contingency legal fees.
2 s
125. See Kenneth A. Ewing, Comment, Quantum Meruit in Ohio: The Search for a Fair Stan-
dard in Contingent Fee Contracts, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 109, 110 & n.4 (1992) (listing
statutory, common law, and court rule approval of lawyers' contingency fees).
126. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Con-
tingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 231, 231-32 (1998).
127. See Radin, supra note 6, at 69-72.
128. See, e.g., Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1430 (11th Cir.
1996) (noting that contingency fee arrangements are prohibited in France); Macedo v.
Boeing Co., 693 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that lawyers are not permitted to
make contingent fee agreements in Portugal); Fiorenza v. United States Steel Int'l, 311 F.
Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (noting that contingency fee arrangements are not permit-
ted in Bahamas); W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
ACQUISITION REGULATION § 33.32 (1996) (noting that contingency fee agreements are void
in France and Germany); Stefano Agostini, Advertising and Solicitation: A Comparative Analysis
of Why Italian and American Lawyers Approach Their Profession Differently, 10 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 329, 341 (1996) (noting that contingency fees are strictly prohibited in Italy);
Betty M. Ho, Rethinking the System of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of Hong Kong,
42 MCGILL L.J. 603, 641 (1997) (noting that Hong Kong does not have a contingency fee
system); Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial Reporting and Risk Management in the
21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. RV. 1987, 2063 n.351 (1997) (" '[Clontingency fee arrange-
ments ... are largely forbidden abroad.'") (citations omitted); CaroleJ. Petersen, Equality as
a Human Right: The Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong Kong, 34 COLUM. J. TRAN-
SNAT'L L. 335, 358 (1996) (noting that lawyers are prohibited from operating on
contingency fee basis because of ethical rules in Hong Kong); Frederick J. Tansill, Offshore
Asset Protection Trusts: Emphasizing Non-Tax Issues, SB45 ALI-ABA 389, 448 (1998) (noting that
Nevis law prohibits contingency fees); Richard Vaznaugh, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-
Environmental Muscle for the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. RV. 207, 215 (1993) (noting that Mexican law does not permit contingency fee ar-
rangements).
Financing Plaintiffs'Lawsuits
A. Champerty in England
England has traditionally barred all champertous agreements.
Contingency fees, for example, were viewed as degrading to the
legal profession because they might lead to oppressive bargains
between the client and lawyer, encourage the solicitation of legal
business, or increase improper litigation. 9 In recent years, how-
ever, England adopted a kind of contingency fee system, called a
"conditional fee.' ' 30 The "conditional fee" has two parts: an agreed
upon hourly rate for the lawyer's services, and an "uplift" which is
an additional percentage, up to 100%, '1 of the original hourly fee
if the case succeeds.132 Usually the "uplift" is limited to twenty-five
percent of the damages recovered for the client.3 3 Since 1998, con-
tingency fees have been permitted in all kinds of civil actions other
than family law matters.TM Moreover, this past winter the English
Parliament debated amending the Courts and Legal Services Act of
1990 to add a subsection that permits a conditionally funded
agreement which is defined as "an agreement made between a law-
yer, his client, and some third person who agrees to act as funder
to the action being pursued by the client.'
3 5
The Courts and Legal Services Act has also been interpreted very
broadly to increase the situations in which contingency fee arrange-
ments are permissible. In Ashford v. Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd., 6 the
chancery division held that a contingency fee arrangement between
129. See Radin, supra note 6, at 69-72.
130. See Courts & Legal Services Act, 1990, § 58 (Eng.); Conditional Fee Agreements
Order, S.I. 1995, No. 1674; Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, S.I. 1995, No. 1675;
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 267, 268 (1998).
Under the new system, lawyers who participate in a conditional fee agreement (CFA)
must treat all disbursements (for example, court fees, expert witness fees) as overhead. In
exchange, if they win, they are entitled to an "uplift" of their fees to a maximum of 100%.
SeeJ S Publications, Factsheet 22: Conditional Fees and Their Likely Impact (last modified Nov. 2,
1998) <http://www.jspubs.com/factmain.22.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
131. See Clare.Dyer, Brave New Dea4 GUARDIAN, May 16, 1995, at T13.
132. See Audra A. Albright, Comment, Could This Be the Last Gasp? England's First Case
Against the British Tobacco Industry, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 363, 373 (1997).
133. See id.; see also Alison Clarke, Law: Justice for the Not-So-Rich; 'No-Wn, No-Fee' Deals
Mean We Can All Afford Lawyers. So Look Forward to Lots of Litigation, INDEPENDENT (LONDON),
Feb. 4, 1999, at 14 (noting that the Law Society recommends a cap of 25% and research
shows that lawyers are following that voluntary limit).
134. See Conditional Fee Agreements Order, S.I. 1998, No. 1860.
135. Comments of The Lord Chancellor in response to the Access to Justice Bill [H.L.],
UK PARL. PUB. DATABASE, Feb. 11, 1999, at col. 449.
136. 3W.L.R. 172 (Ch. 1998).
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the client and his solicitor for an arbitration case was not void for
champerty even though the Courts and Legal Services Act permits
conditional fees only for "'proceedings in court.' ,137 The Vice-
Chancellor's opinion emphasized that the law of champerty and
the rejection of contingency fees for lawyers rested on the
"bedrock" of public policy, but public policy changes with time,
and what was champertous and unlawful before is not necessarily
so today.1s
The high cost to the taxpayer of the nation's legal aid system for
poorer litigants has caused this turnabout in English policy. 9 In
1997, the Lord Chancellor proposed eliminating legal aid for per-
sonal injury cases, about a quarter of all legal aid cases, which cost
the taxpayer about £160 million a year.' 4° Using third parties, either
lawyers or others, to fund litigation gives less affluent people access
to the justice system without burdening taxpayers. Of course, un-
der the English system poor litigants would still have less access to
the courts than those in the United States because even though
they would not have to pay their own lawyer's fees under a contin-
gency fee arrangement, if they lost they would have to pay the
winner's costs. This possibility raises the need for some kind of in-
surance to protect against this kind of expense, but the insurance
is not available to all plaintiffs.41 The English legal aid system also
does not provide any assistance to small businesses that may have
very limited resources for litigation. 4 2 They too will be assisted in
proceeding with claims or defending themselves against claims by a
contingency fee system.
One commentator has noted that the new contingency fee sys-
tem has significantly increased "access to justice."4 3 In the first year
of its implementation, when the kinds of cases to which it applied
were more limited than they are now, approximately 1000 people a
month brought legal claims that they otherwise would not have
brought because they could not afford to pay for a lawyer, and they
could not qualify for legal aid.'"
137. Conditional Fee Deal in Arbitration Valid, TIMEs (LONDON), Apr. 23, 1998, at 42
(citations omitted).
138. See id.
139. SeeJ S Publications, supra note 130.
140. See id.
141. SeeJohn C. Evans, England's New Conditional Fee Agreements: How Will They Change
Litigation?, 63 DEF. COUNS.J. 376, 378 (1996).
142. See Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, § 17(1) (Eng.); Legal Aid Act, 1988, Ch. 49,
Sched. 10 § 2 (Eng.).
143. Albright, supra note 132, at 374-75.
144. See Crania Langdon, Law: Pay to Win-The Introduction of the No-Win, No-Fee Deals
Proved Popular with Clients, GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 1996, at T17.
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This change in England, the very model of a champerty-free,
non-American system, is quite remarkable. It reflects the recogni-
tion that, because litigation is so expensive, potential litigants
without financial resources will be denied their day in court. Lord
Hoffmann, who in upholding assignments of causes of actions
from companies to individuals so that the latter would get legal aid
to pursue the cases (because under English law only a "person,"
not a company, is entitled to legal aid),45 has noted:
The cost of obtaining justice in England, only too often pro-
hibitive, is a current social problem which goes to the roots of
civil society. The provision of a system of justice to resolve dis-
putes between citizens is one of the most ancient and
important duties of the state. But the cost of litigation is today
so high that the majority of people are in practice unable to
seek redress for the wrongs they have suffered. This applies
not only to individuals but also to companies with modest re-
146
sources.
Allowing a third party, whether it is the lawyer or some other inves-
tor, to fund meritorious litigation helps to assure that potential
litigants will not be denied access to the justice system merely be-
cause they do not have the money to gain admittance.
B. Champerty in Australia
Of the six Australian states and two territories, three states (New
South Wales, South Australia and Victoria) have by statute abol-
ished criminal and civil liability for maintenance and champerty 47
In West Australia there have been legislative debates about the
high costs of litigation being beyond the budget of any legal aid
system, the unfairness of people needing legal help not being able
to afford it or to receive legal aid, and the importance of the avail-
ability of contingency fee arrangements as in the United States and
145. SeeLegal Aid Act, 1988, § 2(10) (Eng.).
146. Circuit Sys. Ltd. v. Zuken-Redac (U.K.) Ltd., 1997 App. Cas. (appeal taken from
England).
147. See Maintenance and Champerty Abolition Act, 1993, no. 88, 2 N.S.W. Stat. (1993);
Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, sched. 1] § 1 (3) (S. Austl.); Crimes Act, 1958, pt. IA
§ 322A (Vict.).
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some Australian states.'48 Nevertheless, everywhere in Australia
champertous agreements may still be treated as contrary to public
policy or otherwise illegal. 4 9 As in the United States, however,
courts do not seem eager to invalidate agreements merely because
they are champertous. 1
50
For example, the High Court of Australia, in a case involving a
bankrupt party, asserted that a "bare right of litigation" is not as-
signable, but property is assignable even though it may not be
recovered without litigation. 5 ' The court then held that under the
Australian Bankruptcy Act 152 the right to an appeal is property, and
therefore an agreement between a bankrupt (who by definition
has no money to pursue a legal appeal) and a third party willing to
finance the appeal in exchange for a share of the proceeds is not
illegal as champertous.1
5
Australian courts, like some courts in the United States, have
held that for maintenance and champerty to be unlawful, the third
party must be acting as an officious intermeddler. 154 In addition,
they have recognized several exceptions to the prohibitions against
maintenance and champerty. One is for a "'genuine commercial
interest,"' and another is the "'statutory power of sale"' excep-
tion. 55 In the former the third party must have a "genuine and
substantial interest in the success of the litigation ... [that] exists
independently of the allegedly infringing contract." 56 The second
exception exists strictly in a bankruptcy context to allow trustees in
148. See Acts Amendment (Legal Costs) Bill-Second Reading, Leg. Assembly 6481 (Sept. 18,
1997) (remarks of Mr. Prince); Professional Standards Bill-Second Reading, Leg. Assembly
4398 (June 19, 1997) (remarks of Mr. Prince).
149. See In reTosich Constr. Ltd. (1997) 115 A. Crim. R.
150. See, e.g., Clyne v. New South Wales Bar Ass'n (1960) 104 C.L.R. 186, 192, 203
(doubting that crimes of maintenance and champerty were still viable and noting that rea-
sons for importance of the crimes disappeared long ago); AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N,
REPORT No. 27, STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 1 340 (1985) (noting only one
prosecution for maintenance between 1935 and 1985, an unsuccessful one in 1959); NEW
SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, DISCUSSION PAPER 36-BARRATRY, MAINTENANCE AND
CHAMPERTY § 2.15 (1994) (noting paucity of civil actions for maintenance resulted in calls
for abolition of tort of maintenance on grounds of obsolescence).
151. Cummings v. Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 C.L.R1 124, 150.
152. Bankruptcy Act, 1966 (Austd.).
153. See id. But see Magic Menu Sys. Ltd. v. A.F.A. Facilitation Pty. Ltd., No. QG 125 of
Fed. No. 358/96 (Austl. Fed. Ct. May 8, 1996) (holding that "arm" of franchisees' associa-
tion, which seemed to act only for its own private pecuniary interest not for the good of
association's members, entered into illegal champertous agreement with franchisees who
were suing their franchisor when it funded their litigation in exchange for fee contingent
on outcome of the case).
154. See Magic Menu, No. QG 125 of 1995 Fed. No. 358/96 at 8.




bankruptcy and liquidators to sell company property.'57 A third ex-
ception exists for those with a family connection to the litigant or
those providing financial support for reasons of charity.5 A fourth
exception exists for a third party who shares with the litigant "'a
bona fide community of pecuniary interest or religion or principles
or problems.' 059
The common interest exception was used by the Tasmanian Su-
preme Court in refusing to enjoin the Housing Industry
Association from supporting the appeal of a small contractor who
had had a judgment of almost $35,000 assessed against him by the
owner of a house he had built."w The association argued that the
members of the organization had an interest in the outcome of the
contractor's case because they could be subject to similar law-
suits----that it was an industry issue not just a personal one.16' The
court also recognized that the contractor had no assets with which
to pursue the appeal on his own and that the plaintiffs purpose in
pursuing the action for an injunction was to force the withdrawal
of the association's financial support, so the appeal would be dis-
continued.' 62 The court noted the "change in public opinion on
the question of supporting litigation," and agreed that "a collection
of out of date rules which no longer fit the conditions of modem
life" should not be upheld.
63
Contingency legal fees are also allowed in all Australian federal
cases except for family and criminal matters.4 The states and terri-
tories are considering allowing contingency fees to combat the
continuing increase in the number of people priced out of the jus-
tice system.165
157. See id.
158. See Magic Menu, No. QG 125 of 1995 Fed. No. 358/96 at 9.
159. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
160. Moloney v. Housing Indus. Ass'n Ltd., No. 371/1992 (Tasmanian Sup. Ct. Dec. 4,
1992).
161. See id. at *9-10.
162. See id. at *10.
163. Id. at *16-17 (quoting Baker v. Jones (1954) 1 W.L.R 1005 and Alabaster v. Har-
ness (1895) 1 QB 339, respectively).
164. See Australia Reforms Its Legal System, LAw. INT'L,JuIy 1, 1995, at 2.
165. See, e.g., ); Peter Elliott, Letters: No Win-No Fee a Win-Win Idea, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Feb.
26, 1999, at 42 (considering whether New South Wales would adopt U.S.-style contingency
fee system); Grace Malatesta, Win or Fee Cut Plan for Court, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 29, 1999,
at 27 (noting that West Australian Law Reform Commission says American contingency fee
system could resolve problem of potential litigants without financial resources).
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C. Champerty in Canada
Canada's courts generally have taken a very rational approach to
the doctrines of maintenance and champerty. While recognizing
that champerty is prohibited for public policy reasons and because
of a reliance on the ancient common law of England,'6 Canadian
courts have been willing to recognize exceptions for any kind of
pre-existing financial interest 67 and whenever the third party sup-
port is for "a legitimate purpose that does not jeopardize the
integrity of the judicial process. "'68 As far back as 1907, the Su-
preme Court of Canada noted that champerty should be
prohibited only if it promotes unnecessary litigation, is immoral, or
arises from a bad motive.169
Contingency fees are permitted in every Canadian province ex-
cept Ontario.7 0 There is an exception in Ontario, however, which
permits lawyers for class action plaintiffs to enter agreements with
their clients promising payment of fees only in the event of suc-
cess. If successful, the lawyer can ask the court's approval to
increase the base fee by an "uplift," that is, applying a multiple to
the fee.
In 1996 the Ontario government established the Ontario Legal
Aid Review to study and report on legal aid and the needs of low-
income residents. 7 3 The resulting document reported on an em-
pirical study comparing litigation in Ontario and British Columbia,
where a contingency fee system similar to the one in the United
States is permitted. 74 The study concluded that contingency fee
arrangements probably increase access to justice.7 5 The Review
panel also concluded that such arrangements would not encourage
166. See e.g., Union Gas Co. of Can. v. Brown [1968] D.L.R. 44, 49.
167. See Collar v. Edmonton [1992] A.R. 39; Fredrickson v. Insurance Corp. of B.C.
[1986] B.C.L.R. 145, 156.
168. Margetts v. Timmer Estates, [1999] 1999 D.L.R. Lexis *12.
169. SeeNewswanderv. Giegerich, [1907] 39 S.C.R. 354.
170. SeeAn Act Respecting Champerty, R.S.O., ch. 327 (1897) (Can.); Contingency Fees in
Ontario, LAw. INT'L, Mar. 1, 1996, at 2; REPORT OF THE ONTARIO LEGAL AID REVIEW: A
BLUEPRINT FOR PUBLICLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES ch. 13 (1998) (available from Ontario
Government Bookstore, 880 Bay St., Toronto, Canada) [hereinafter ONTARIO REPORT].
171. SeeClass Proceedings Act, S.O., § 33(1) (1992) (Can.).
172. See Gagne v. Silcorp Ltd., No. C28348 (O.A.C. Oct. 21, 1998) (discussing the ap-
propriate considerations on a motion for contingency fee, created by applying a multiple to
base fee).





frivolous litigation because lawyers are not likely to take on unmeri-
torious cases when their fees are contingent upon their winning.'
76
One of the other methods of increasing access to justice for
poorer litigants that the Review panel considered is a Contingency
Legal Aid Fund.'" Under this arrangement, which has been imple-
mented in Hong Kong, litigants whose cases are accepted after merit
and means tests would be supported in their litigation by the Fund,
in return for agreeing to pay the Fund a percentage of any recov-
ery.'7 8 This certainly sounds like a government-as-champertor plan.
Presumably the Fund would refuse to support cases that did not have
a reasonable chance of being successful, but then, so would private
investors. The Fund would not support cases merely to harass defen-
dants, but neither would private investors. Moreover, in this age of
privatization, it is the general wisdom that private industry can deliver
services better and more efficiently than government. There is no rea-
son to expect that supporting legal services would be an exception.
III. LITIGATION SUPPORT FIRMs
If potential litigants have good cases but no money in the
United States, and now in England and much of Canada and Aus-
tralia, they may be able to find lawyers willing to be their advocates
on a contingency fee or conditional fee basis. In addition, they now
may have another alternative, the litigation support firm. If a liti-
gant has won a judgment that is being appealed, the chances of
finding a lawyer willing to undertake the appeal on a contingency
fee basis are much less, making the emergence of litigation sup-
port firms particularly important.
One such firm receiving a great deal of publicity is the Judg-




179. See, e.g., Simon Barker-Benfield, First Business: Lenders Have a New and Very Specialized
Competitor, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 26, 1997, at 5; Eric Freedman, They Scan Docket Sheets
Instead of the Stock Tables, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1996, at B1; Reynolds Holding, Investing in Other
People's Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 1996, at B1;Jennifer Huie, Sell Futures in Your Verdict,
Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1997, at 8; Leigh Jones, Legal Beat: Judgment Purchase Enters Oklahoma, U.
Rc., Oct. 15, 1998; Louis Lavelle, Firm Gambles on Litigants' Wins, Buys Stake in Awards, REc.,
N.N.J., May 9, 1997, at BI; Molly McDonough, Venture Capitalists See Profits in Judgments on
Appea4 CHI. DAILY L. BUL., July 6, 1998, at 1; Lara Wozniak, Company Buys into the Appeals
Process, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 4, 1996, at 1E.
180. See LawFinance/group inc. (last modified Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.lawfinance.com>
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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company explains that it provides cash for litigation and personal
expenses in exchange for a share of a money judgment on ap-
peal.' 8' The company is only an investor; control of the case
remains with the client and attorney.8 2 If the case is lost, the client
owes nothing.
8 3
On its web site, JPC describes one of its cases in which the own-
ers of an upscale restaurant sued the developer of the shopping
center where they were located for fraud and breach of contract.18
4
The plaintiffs had limited financial resources and were forced to
liquidate their assets and sell their home to continue financing the
lawsuit, which the wealthy developer kept going for six years.185
Plaintiffs won, and the developer appealed. 86 Instead of settling
the case for a fraction of the judgment because of their lack of fi-
nancial resources to continue, they sold a share of the judgment to
JPC and were able to hire a prominent appellate counsel who re-
ceived a fair settlement offer within six months.
187
JPC will consider investing only if the judgment on appeal is
over $200,000, and the defendant has the financial resources or
has posted a bond.'" The maximum stake in a case JPC will buy is
twenty-five percent.8 9 For example, in a case with a $1 million ver-
dict, JPC might buy a twenty-five percent share, giving the client
$100,000. If the award is upheld, JPC makes $150,000, and the cli-
ent keeps the $100,000 and whatever else the court awards. JPC
says it does not give legal advice and is not privy to confidential in-
formation.' 9° It is not stirring up litigation because it supports only
appeals. One professor of legal ethics is discomfited, however, by
JPC's retention of control over the selection of counsel and its abil-
ity to blackball an attorney who pursues a strategy JPC does not
181. See LawFinance/group inc., Features and Benefits Civil Appeal Investment Program (last
modified Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.lawfinance.com/FEATBENE/FEATBENE.HTM> (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
182. See id. JPC does not require specific appellate counsel, but must approve the cli-
ent's choice-" 'quality control.'" See Freedman, supra note 178, at B3 (citations omitted).
183. See Law/Finance group inc., supra note 180.
184. See Law/Finance group inc., Case Histories (last modified Aug. 12, 1999)
<http://www.lawfinance.com/CASESUMS/CASESUMS.HTM> (on file with the University of




188. See Leigh Jones, Judgment Purchase Enters Oklahoma, J. Rac., Oct. 15, 1998. Other re-
ports say the minimum amount of the judgment must be $300,000. See Jan Ackerman, Firm
Takes Gamble Aiding Plaintiffs on Appeal of Damages, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 1999,
at Al.
189. See Holding, supra note 179, at B1. Other reports say the maximum amount of the
stake is 50%. See Ackerman, supra note 188, at Al.
190. See Holding, supra note 180, at B1.
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like.'91 Another legal ethics expert described JPC's business as
"'perfectly lawful under universally recognized legal principles.' ,192
Although it may be the best known, JPC is not the only firm in
the United States investing in litigation. Recently, General Electric
Capital Corporation (GECC) has agreed to pay $5.8 million for a
$10 million contingency share in a $151 million judgment against
Chase Manhattan Bank. 93 The agreement provides that the one-
third contingent fee must be paid first out of any award that sur-
vives the appeal.9 4 It is reasonable to expect that GECC's
involvement will have an effect on settlement negotiations. Both
the plaintiff, Lot$off, and Chase know GECC has analyzed the
chances of the judgment being sustained on appeal and that could
give Lot$off, which had filed for bankruptcy, a more even playing
field than it otherwise would have had.'95
In Australia, a well known Sydney stockbroker, Ren6 Rivkin,
created a litigation business, the Justice Corporation, last year.196
Within its first month of operation it had processed 200 requests
for financing, including six requests from consumer groups seek-
ing support for class actions.'97 Moreover, the New South Wales
Legal Aid Commission considered referring commercial cases to
the new company. 98 Surprisingly, from the American perspective,
Australians seem more willing to permit businesspeople to invest
in litigation than to accept a contingency fee system for lawyers.'"
Consequently, the creation of the Justice Corporation caused
negative comment from lawyers, who complained that it was
"introducing contingency fees without an upper limit, which was
worse than the American system." 2°° Lawyers complained that,
unlike the Justice Corporation, they could not charge fees based
on a percentage of their clients' winnings; they could receive only
an "uplift" for financing their clients' cases, capped in New South
191. See Freedman, supra note 180, at BI (quoting George Schatzki, professor of legal
ethics at the University of Connecticut).
192. Ackerman, supra note 188, atAl (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.).
193. See 50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Banque Paribas (Suisse) S.A., No. SA-95-CA-159, 1997 WL
790739 (W.D. Tex. May 20, 1997); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts for Sale: Plaintiffs Sell
Portions of Million-DollarJudgments to Weather Long Appeals, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 11, 1999, at Al.
194. See Bruce Rubenstein, Company Sells Shares injury Award as Appeal Hedge, CORP. LE-
GAL TIMES, Dec. 1998, at 32.
195. See id.
196. See Bill Pheasant, Ruling to Help Recovery Suits by Liquidators, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June
12, 1998, at 26.
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Wales at twenty-five percent.20' The emergence of Rivkin's company
has encouraged politicians to support a removal of the ban on con-
tingency fees.02 One commentator noted that the ban "'enables
private financiers to step into an area where trained lawyers should
be making the judgment on the issues.' , 203
In Canada, a new public company was created this year whose
sole purpose is financing large patent infringement lawsuits in the
United States.20" The company is trading on the Alberta Stock Ex-
change and asserts that "[f]or the first time ever, the public can
own a risk-adjusted portfolio of multi-million dollar lawsuits."20 5 The
president of the company notes that even if a patent owner whose
patent is being infringed can retain counsel on a contingency fee
basis, the cost of discovery, experts, and travel can be so expensive
as to preclude litigation as a viable option. 2°6
This Article began with a reference to "the waterbed case," a
patent infringement case. Although Charlie Hall, the inventor,
had his patent infringement case against Intex dismissed because
he syndicated his potential rights in order to support the litiga-
tion in violation of California's public policy against champerty,
the case did not end there. Instead of assigning part of his inter-
est in the litigation, Hall assigned an undivided sixty-five percent
20'interest in his patent to WBX Partners, as is authorized by fed-
eral law.208 He then moved for reinstatement of his claim against
Intex, joining WBX in the action. 209 The court held that because
the patent had already expired, and the only source of income
remaining to be exploited was the claim for damages for
infringement, the case should be tried on its merits.2 0 A jury
awarded Hall more than $6 million.2 "
201. See id.
202. See Chris Merritt, McClelland Urges Callinan Inquiry, AusTL. FIN. REv., Oct. 23, 1998,
at 29.
203. Id. (quoting the Federal Opposition's shadow Attorney-General Robert McClel-
land).
204. See Letter from Kerry Knoll, Vice-President, Corporate Affairs, Patent Enforcement
and Royalties, Ltd. (PEARL) to Susan L. Martin (May 4, 1999) (on file with author).
205. Id.
206. See Letter from John A. Cocomile, President, Patent Enforcement and Royalties,
Ltd. (PEARL) to Susan L. Martin (Mar. 1, 1999) (on file with author).
207. See Hall v. Aqua Queen, Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1551 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1996); WRIGHT, su-
pra note 4, at 2.
208. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1998).
209. See Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. Hall, No. C-85-2987-JPV, 1991 WL 270167 (N.D. Cal.
July 10, 1991).
210. See id. at 2.
211. See Intex Plastic Sales Co. v. Hall, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
affd, 960 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition).
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Hall was successful, and the new Canadian company saw a niche
for itself because United States law permits the assignment of pat-
ents or an interest in them. Thus, financial backers can support
litigation in such cases in exchange for an interest in the patent
instead of an interest in the litigation which, in many cases such as
Hall's, amounts to the same thing. The litigation supporters thus
will not run afoul of any common law, statutory, or public policy
prohibitions against champerty.
IV. ELIMINATING THE EVILS OF CHAMPERTY WHILE
PRESERVING ITS ADVANTAGES
It is interesting to speculate why an investment company should
be able to support litigation for patent infringement, clearly a legal
undertaking, but not litigation for injury caused by a product de-
fect, or for breach of contract, or any other cause of action. In
medieval England, interference in litigation was feared because
powerful nobles and officials could use it to harass less fortunate
people.2 Their financial interests might encourage them to sub-
orn judges and witnesses and to pursue frivolous suits to oppress
hapless defendants.
212
Today a variety of mechanisms are available to discourage those
evils, making a ban on champerty completely unnecessary. Such
mechanisms include causes of action for malicious prosecution and
abuse of process.2" There are prohibitions against instituting or
maintaining frivolous actions, and sanctions for doing so.215 Law-
yers are bound by rules of professional conduct as well as by public
policy disallowing excessive fees. 6 There are also doctrines of un-
conscionability, duress, and good faith that establish standards of
behavior for those entering into agreements for the support of
212. See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 150, § 2.9.
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8351-8354 (1998) (codifying common law tort of
malicious prosecution); Farm Serv. Coop. v. Goshen Farms, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Ark.
1979); Adams v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 51-54 (Ct. App. 1992); Klesh v. Coddington,
684 A.2d 530, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895,
901-02, 905 (Okla. 1994); Ely v. Whitlock, 385 S.E.2d 893, 895-97 (Va. 1989).
215. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1999); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 128.5 (1998); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6F (1998); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8303 (McKinney 1998); N.Y. R. OF CT. § 130-
1.1 (McKinney 1998); TEX. R. OF CT. 13 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (1998).
216. See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.5(a), (d) (1987); LA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R 1.5(a), (d) (1999); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.5(a), (d) (1992); N.H.
RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.5(a), (d) (1999); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.5(a),
(d) (1994).
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litigation.2 '7 The Massachusetts court in Saladini v. Righellis an-
nounced that it would "scrutinize an agreement to finance a lawsuit
with care."2 18 That is an appropriate undertaking for courts. These
safeguards can prevent any potential mischief caused by financial
backers of litigants.
As the Massachusetts court recognized, allowing third parties to
support litigation, rather than creating evils in our justice system,
may actually improve it. Today we know that great injustice arises
when lack of wealth keeps people with meritorious cases from pur-
suing them or when lack of wealth forces people to abandon cases
or agree to unfair settlements because their opponents have
greater financial resources. Furthermore, if someone like Righellis
does find a person willing to support his litigation in exchange for
a share of the award, it is patently unfair for him to receive a wind-
fall were a court to invalidate his agreement with the financial
backer. Even abroad, where eliminating litigation used to be a
prime value, increasing access to the courts is now viewed as a basic
necessity in ajustice system."'
A well-known legal ethics expert has offered another important
reason for facilitating the bringing of legal claims. Geoffrey Hazard
has said:
Claimant litigation fills a gap between individual decision-
making-for example, a decision not to smoke cigarettes-
and mobilization of legislative authority to change the legal
ground rules.... [E]stablished interests can long postpone
legislative efforts to change the rules.... [C]laimant litigation
often performs the political function of the little boy who said
that the emperor had no clothes. Those of us generally
sympathetic to emperors-that is, to maintenance of estab-
lished authority-have to keep that in mind.22°
Because individuals rarely have the wherewithal to litigate the
kinds of cases that have the most dramatic impact (for example,
those involving tobacco, asbestos, drugs, or chemicals), plaintiffs
generally bring such claims as class actions. Class actions are fi-
nanced by lawyers who often end up getting far more of the
217. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997).
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., NEw SOUTH WALES LAw REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 150, § 2.16;
Conditional Fee Deal in Arbitration Valid, TIMES (LoNDoN), Apr. 23, 1998, at 42.
220. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Brits Adopt U.S.-Style Tort Litigation Methods, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
13, 1997, at A15.
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proceeds of the action than any of the claimants. 2' Allowing others
to finance these suits as an investment might actually reduce the
cost of the litigation by creating competition with class action law
firms. A partner in such a firm has estimated that there are fewer
than twenty firms nationwide that are primarily class actions
firms. 22 She asserts that these experts would not want to work for
investors at an hourly rate;22 3 however, perhaps a new way of financ-
ing such cases would create more experts in the field and a fairer,
more efficient way of conducting such litigation. The financial re-
sources of the law firm supporting the litigation will influence a
class action defendant in deciding whether or not to settle early at
a high figure. If the law firm is not one of the premier twenty but a
less financially endowed firm, the defendant might attempt to ex-
224haust the plaintiffs' resources by dragging out discovery for years.




Some commentators have argued for the elimination of the
prohibition on maintenance and champerty because the "free
trade" of legal claims is efficient. 2 6 This Article recognizes that
there may be a market for legal claims if the champerty barrier
were lifted. It argues for eliminating rules against champerty, how-
ever, not because it makes economic sense, but because it would
221. See Martin, supra note 1, at 508-09.
222. See Elizabeth Joan Cabreser, Syndicating Litigation: Advocacy, Ethics and the Lim-
its of Entreneurship 7 n.12 (Aug. 8, 1993) (presented at ABA Annual Meeting) (on file with
author).
223. See id. at 8.
224. SeeJudge Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation 26 (Mar. 18,
1993) (Second Annual Pope and John Lecture on Professionalism, Northwestern University
School of Law, Chicago, Ill.) (on file with author).
225. One commentator has noted another barrier to third party support for litigation-
federal security laws. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1308. If a litigant wanted to put together
a syndicate to finance a lawsuit, it might require compliance with stringent securities law
requirements. See id. This Article is concerned with eliminating bans on champerty to keep
court doors open to those with limited financial resources. It is not concerned with balanc-
ing the interests of a litigant in obtaining court access and the interests of potential investors
in access to information about the investment. There is no reason to assume that such inves-
tors would be any less entitled to investment safeguards such as disclosure and government
registration than investors in any other kind of investment opportunity.
226. See, e.g., Dobner, supra note 123, at 1532; see also, Peter Charles Choharis, A Compre-
hensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform 12 YALEJ. ON REG. 435 (1995) (arguing for a tort claims
market).
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help to make the legal system more of a justice system. One cannot
expect justice if the outcome of a lawsuit depends on which party
has greater financial staying power. The United States legal system
recognized long ago that lack of financial resources would in effect
close court doors to many people with meritorious claims. Thus,
contingency fees were permitted in this country long before they
were available elsewhere. For the same reasons that lawyers are
permitted to finance their clients' lawsuits, others (friends, rela-
tives, businesspeople) should be able to enter into agreements with
litigants to finance the litigation in exchange for a share of any
proceeds of the litigation. The investors should be able to know
that those agreements are enforceable, and the litigants should
know that their claims will not be dismissed because of their third
party support.
